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ABSTRACT
In this paper I investigate the epistemic implications of a recent theory of religious cognition 
that draws on predictive coding. The theory argues that certain experiences are heavily 
shaped by a subject’s prior (religious) beliefs and thereby makes religious believers prone to 
detect invisible agents. The theory is an update of older theories of religious cognition but 
departs from them in crucial ways. I will assess the epistemic implications by reformulating 
existing arguments based on other (older) theories of religious cognition. 
Keywords: cognitive science of religion, predictive coding, epistemology of religious belief, 
reliabilist epistemology, the safety condition for knowledge.
RESUMO
Neste artigo investigo as implicações epistêmicas de uma teoria recente da cognição reli-
giosa que se baseia na codificação preditiva. A teoria argumenta que certas experiências 
são fortemente moldadas pelas crenças prévias (religiosas) de um sujeito e, desse modo, 
torna os crentes religiosos propensos a detectar agentes invisíveis. A teoria é uma atual-
ização das teorias mais antigas da cognição religiosa, mas se afasta delas de maneiras cruci-
ais. Avaliarei as implicações epistêmicas reformulando os argumentos existentes baseados 
em outras teorias (antigas) da cognição religiosa.
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Introduction
In this paper I investigate the epistemic implications of a recent theory of religious cognition 
that draws on predictive coding. The theory argues that certain experiences are heavily shaped by 
a subject’s prior (religious) beliefs and thereby makes religious believers prone to detect invisible 
agents. The theory is an update of older theories of religious cognition but departs from them in 
crucial ways. I will assess the epistemic implications by reformulating existing arguments based 
on other (older) theories of religious cognition. 
This paper is structured as follows: in the second section, I lay out the predictive coding 
framework on which the new theory draws; in the third section, I discuss the new theory; in the 
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fourth section, I discuss three arguments that draw on the-
ories of religious cognition. They are the ‘unreliability argu-
ment’, ‘the unsafety argument’ and the ‘naturalness argument’.
I argue that the new theory does not support a conclu-
sion for or against a positive epistemic status of religious be-
liefs. I also argue that the new theory leads to conclusions that 
are different from those of older theories of religious cogni-
tion. I end with some concluding remarks. 
Predictive coding
Predictive Coding (PC) is a theory that is gaining trac-
tion in neuroscience and cognitive science. The main idea is 
that the brain is a Bayesian prediction machine which con-
stantly runs and updates mental models of the environment. 
By operating in this way, the human mind can maximize ac-
curacy and efficiency. The operations of the ‘prediction ma-
chine’ heavily shape perception. In this section, I will give a 
brief outline of the theory.2
Most discussion on PC focuses on perceptual experi-
ences. PC rejects the idea that perceptual experience is de-
termined by sensory input. Instead, perceptual experiences 
are heavily shaped by the human brain’s internal operations. 
The brain constantly predicts what the subject perceives 
and thereby shapes perception. The core of PC is adequately 
captured by Hawkins and Blakeslee when they write: “Your 
predictions not only precede sensations, they determine 
sensation” (Hawkins and Blakeslee, 2004, p. 158). During 
perceptual experiences, the brain runs a model of the world 
and makes predictions about the causes of sensory input. For 
example, when a subject walks through a forest, her internal 
model will predict visual perceptions caused by trees. The 
model will shape perceptual experiences in such a way that 
incoming rays of light are processed as trees. The brain can do 
so because the model it runs has information about the statis-
tical structure of some set of observed input. In other words, 
the model predicts what objects (or persons) the subject is 
likely to experience. In this way, the brain is always guessing 
what will happen next. The expectations derived from the 
model will influence what perceptual experiences the subject 
will have. Perception is thus always theory-laden in the sense 
that our perceptual experiences always depend heavily on a 
set of priors coming from the internal model. 
Defenders of PC often compare the human brain to a 
Bayesian probability machine. Depending on its internal 
model, the human brain makes a guess about what the subject 
is likely to experience. When our subject walks in the forest, 
she is very likely to encounter trees because the prior prob-
ability of finding trees in a forest is high. She is far less like-
ly to encounter tall buildings. Therefore, her internal model 
will usually make her have experiences of trees rather than of 
buildings. Experiences of trees in turn strengthen the internal 
model and the probability of finding new trees rises. In this 
way, experiences are both shaped by prior probabilities and 
bootstrap future probabilities. 
The human brain is, however, not blind to the external 
world. While the model (or models) usually tries to match all 
sensory input to the existing model of the world,3 the brain 
also looks for sensory input that does not match its model of 
the world. When this occurs, the brain makes what is known 
as ‘prediction errors’. Although the probability is rather low, 
it is possible that there is a building deep in the forest. While 
visual input of the building will easily be seen as a tree or as 
something else that is expected in a forest, it can be seen as 
the building which it is. In cases like these, there is a mismatch 
between the prediction of the model and the sensory input. 
These mismatches are called ‘prediction errors’. Prediction 
errors prompt the brain to update its internal model of the 
world. In our example, the model of the forest is updated to 
include a building. In this and other situations, the brain is 
able to use the prediction errors to update its internal model 
of the world.4 After the building is perceived as a building, the 
probability of finding other buildings in the forest increases.
Processing of prediction errors can occur at multiple lev-
els. Diuk et al. give the following example:
[I]magine a gambler who arrives at a city with 
multiple casinos, holding a set of coupons 
that allow him to enter any one of the casi-
nos and play a number of different games. 
The gambler enters one casino and plays 
blackjack, roulette, and a slot machine. Each 
time he plays a game, he might observe a 
difference between what he expected to 
win and the actual outcome—a “game-level 
prediction error” that can be used to adjust 
his future expectations about this game. 
However, upon playing the last coupon for 
a casino, he not only learns about the last 
game itself, but also has enough informa-
tion to update his knowledge about the ca-
sino as a whole: was this a good casino to 
spend his coupons on? It is at this point that 
two coincident reward prediction errors 
would arise: a simple game-related predic-
tion error and a higher-level casino-related 
prediction error linked to learning the value 
2 My discussion of PC mainly relies on Andy Clark’s overview of the theory (Clark, 2013). His theory has a broader scope than perceptual 
experience. Since the theory I discuss in the third section focuses on perceptual experiences, I limit the discussion to those experiences 
in this section.
3 Andy Clark (2013) calls this ‘the brain explaining away the sensory signals’.
4 This idea goes back to work on neural networks in artificial intelligence. See Churchland (1990), for an explanation of how neural 
networks learn.
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of the casino as a whole. These prediction 
errors are not redundant. For example, the 
slot machine may have been worse than ex-
pected but the casino better than expected 
(Diuk et al., 2013, p. 5797).
Like the gambler did in the example, the human brain 
can bring prediction errors at different levels together. In our 
example, prediction errors can lead to an update of the inter-
nal model of one particular forest but also to updates about 
forest in general. These levels are not experienced as distinct 
but are brought together by the brain.
An important question is why PC can be expected to be a 
reliable guide to navigate the world. The internal model can be 
completely wrong from the start or not be capable of updating 
its model in the right way. Karl Friston argues that PC works 
towards an optimal model by regulating the use of energy. 
Updates of the internal model of the world are governed by 
what is he calls ‘the free energy principle’ (Friston, 2010). The 
principle states that the brain will work towards minimizing 
the energy used in perceptual experiences. Since prediction er-
rors lead to friction between the model and the world, it uses 
up more energy than a smooth fit. Therefore, the brain will use 
up less energy if it updates its model of the world to prevent 
prediction errors. Although Friston does not state this explic-
itly, he suggests that the free energy principle also prevents PC 
from updating the model too much. Pausing at every sensory 
input to see whether it matches the internal model in detail will 
lead to even more loss of energy. Therefore, PC seeks a balance 
between accuracy and  eed in the internal model. Over time, 
the balance will nonetheless tip in favor of accuracy.
Predictive coding in 
religious cognition
Recently, predictive coding has been applied to reli-
gious cognition. In this section I will discuss predictive cod-
ing in religious cognition as it was proposed by Marc An-
dersen (2017). His theory differs significantly from other 
theories of religious cognition. Whereas other theories usu-
ally state that religious belief (in some rudimentary form) 
comes natural or intuitive, the PC-based theory states that 
religious belief is learned.
The theory received its most elaborate defense by Marc 
Andersen. He draws on two older approaches to religious 
cognition, Hypera ive Agency Detection (HADD) and neu-
roscientific study of religious experiences. I will briefly discuss 
both approaches. In the original theory, the operations of the 
agency detection device were held responsible for why peo-
ple acquire religious beliefs.5 Defenders argue that humans 
are prone to overdetect agents where there are none. People 
easily jump to the conclusion that some agent is around upon 
very limited or ambiguous evidence. Sounds of rustling leaves 
or a branch that vaguely resembles a snake suffice to conclude 
that some agent (usually a person or animal) is around. Being 
hypera ive in detecting agents was evolutionary beneficial. 
Animals and other humans posed (and often still pose) a seri-
ous threat to human survival. Predators or enemies can easily 
sneak up on humans, so it is safe to be on guard. Detecting 
too many agents only leads to limited loss of time and energy 
while detecting one agent too little can lead to instant death. 
Defenders of HADD argue that hypera ivity in the detection 
of agents can easily produce religious beliefs. Usually, people 
look for additional evidence to corroborate or discard their 
hunches that an agent is around. When they cannot find any 
evidence, the belief that an invisible agent is around can arise. 
This can in turn easily lead to belief in spirits or gods.
Marc Andersen notes that the original HADD-theory 
is not well supported by empirical data. According to Ander-
sen, the original theory predicts that religious believers will be 
more prone to overdetect agency than non-believers. Studies 
did not unambiguously support this prediction. One study 
did find that that paranormal and religious believers report-
ed more ‘false alarms’ compared to non-believers in detecting 
human-like faces in artifacts or scenery (Riekki et al., 2013). 
Another study, however, found that paranormal believers 
were more accurate than non-believers in detecting faces in 
a face-house detecting task (Van Elk, 2015).6 
Andersen’s critique of the original HADD theory seems 
overstated. Defenders of the original HADD theory do not 
claim that religious believers have a more hypera ive agen-
cy detection device than non-believers nor that paranormal 
believers do. They rather argue that everyone has a hyper-
a ive agency detection device that could under certain cir-
cumstances foster religious beliefs. They argue that religious 
believers and non-believers have the same experiences of 
agency, but the experiences do not lead to religious beliefs for 
non-believers. Justin Barrett argues that non-believers have 
various strategies (conscious or not) to prevent HADD-ex-
periences from leading to religious beliefs (see Barrett, 2004, 
p. 112-115). The theory also allows for the possibility that 
non-believers never (or rarely) find themselves in situations 
where their agency detection devices are triggered without 
apparent agents around. In these cases, they would not from 
religious beliefs as a result. 
The second related body of research on which Anders-
en draws is neuroscientific studies of experiences of an invis-
ible sensed presence. A sensed presence is the sensation that 
someone or something living is present in the vicinity of the 
5 Variants of the theory were defended by Guthrie (1993), Atran (2002) and Barrett (2004). My discussion of HADD relies mainly on 
Barrett’s work.
6 In the study, visitors of a psychic fair were asked to calassify pictures with different levels of visual noise as representing a face or a 
house. Van Elk and his team concluded that paranormal believers were more accurate by comparing the number of falsely classified 
pictures (Van Elk, 2015).
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subject. Andersen notes that people often have the sensation 
when no identifiable stimulus of a corresponding being or liv-
ing thing is around.7 Neuroscientist Michael Persinger argues 
that experiences of a sensed presence are caused by the effect 
of weak magnetic fields on the temporal lobe.8 Persinger argues 
that the human brain contains a sense of the self in each of its 
hemispheres. Usually, the left hemisphere is dominant and sup-
plies an individual with its everyday experience of self. When 
the right hemisphere is stimulated by electromagnetic force, 
the right hemisphere’s sense of the self comes to intrude on the 
usual experience of self. As a result, it produces the experience 
of another self in the vicinity of the subject. To prove his claims, 
Persinger had a helmet (the God helmet) constructed that 
triggers the right temporal lobe with magnetic force. He claims 
that he successfully produced sensations of a sensed presence in 
subjects with this ‘God helmet’ (Booth et al., 2005).
Persinger’s theory has also been severely criticized. First, 
his framework for the self is not supported in conventional the-
ories of cognitive neuroscience. Second, the magnetic stimula-
tion from Persinger’s God helmet would be too weak to elicit 
brain a ivity. Third, replication of Persinger’s experiments 
with the God helmet failed. A Swedish team used Persinger’s 
God helmet and whole setup to replicate his findings. In their 
experiment, they had a control group where the God helmet 
was switched off. The Swedish team found that the control 
group also reported sensations of a sensed presence. They con-
cluded that the sensations were caused by suggestion rather 
than by magnetic stimulation (Granqvist et al., 2005).
Although Andersen regards both approaches to religious 
cognition as flawed, he suggests that some insights can be in-
corporated in a new theory in line with predictive coding. 
I will call this theory ‘PC HADD’.9 He argues that people will 
be more prone to overdetect agents or feel a sensed presence 
when their internal model of the world expects more agents 
or persons around. He thereby accepts that humans can be 
hypera ive in their agency detection and that suggestion can 
lead to feelings of a sensed presence. When a subject believes 
that invisible agents are around, the belief will act as a top-
down filter on how her sensory input is experienced. She will 
thus be more prone to identify noises or patterns as caused by 
an invisible agent. Making a subject aware that someone or 
something could be around can also act as a top-down filter 
on what that subject experiences. 
Andersen concludes: “The human brain is not prede-
termined to select agent models to account for ambiguous 
stimuli. Instead, the models chosen to account for ambiguous 
sensory evidence rely heavily on context-sensitive subjective 
estimates of prior probability” (Andersen, 2017, p. 10) He ar-
gues that agency detection and experiences of a sensed pres-
ence are to a large extent the result of the context in which 
the subject finds herself. The context comes with certain 
expectations about what the subject could experience. The 
context in which a subject perceives and experiences is to 
some extent determined by her cognitive make-up,10 but is 
to a large extent due to social and cultural factors. Social and 
cultural factors can foster what Andersen calls ‘priors about 
supernatural agents’. One possible source of priors about su-
pernatural agents are religious teachings and texts. Another 
source is guided processing of ambiguous stimuli. An example 
is how some Pentecostal Christians are taught to interpret 
certain bodily sensations as signs from God. Some Pentecostal 
Christians learn to identify a tingling feeling in their stomachs 
as caused by the Holy Spirit.11 The predictive coding frame-
work suggests that once a bodily sensation is identified with 
a cause (like God), prior beliefs will grow stronger. Andersen 
also notes that in many religious traditions believers are en-
couraged to engage in several forms of sensory deprivation. 
For example, Muslims and Christians are required to fast and 
some Hindus are encouraged to perform extreme rituals.12 
Andersen argues that these pra ices force the brain to rely 
more on priors than under normal circumstances. 
Andersen also argues that the nature of many religious 
concepts makes it hard to filter them out of the internal model 
of the world. Many gods and spirits are believed to be invisible 
or even imperceptible. Concepts of gods and spirits are also 
flexible and evasive. Because of these features, religious con-
cepts are impervious to the Bayesian tendencies to revise error.
Michiel van Elk and André Aleman apply the predictive 
coding approach to a number of religious phenomena (2017). 
They argue that religious hallucinations or visions are likely 
related to imprecise coding of predictive signals. According 
to Van Elk and Aleman mystical experiences, where the sub-
ject feels a loss of ego or identity can be explained by chang-
es in the process of multisensory integration. Multi-sensory 
integration is the process whereby information from multi-
ple modalities (sense, touch, vision…) is brought together to 
7 Andersen writes: “Sensed presence can manifest itself in a variety of ways, and is often experienced despite the absence of any iden-
tifiable stimuli corresponding to the experience” (2017, p. 6).
8 Persinger set out his theory in a number of articles (Persinger, 1983, 2001; Persinger et al., 2000). My discussion in this paragraph 
follows Andersen’s discussion of Persinger’s work (Andersen, 2017, p. 6-7).
9 The term ‘PC HADD’ is somewhat confusing as Andersen considers his theory to be a criticism of the original HADD theory. I use the 
term because Andersen’s theory resembles the original HADD theory to a large extent.
10 Andersen refers to Boyer (2002), who argues that subjects easily remember and transmit concepts that are minimally counterintuitive, 
and to Whitehouse (2004), who argues that participation in religious rituals has a profound effect on the transmission of religious beliefs.
11 Andersen got the example from Tanya Luhrmann’s work (2012). Luhrmann did fieldwork in a Pentecostal church and noted that people 
were taught to identify thoughts as infused by God. She argues at length that the identification process requires time and instruction 
by experts.
12 Xygalatas discussed the effects of extreme Hindu rituals in Mauritius on people’s moral behavior (Xygalatas et al., 2013)
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form a coherent image of the body and the environment. Due 
to some changes, integration could go wrong and result in 
mystical experiences. They also argue that predictive coding 
can explain why people pray or sense a supernatural presence. 
Here expectations that govern social intera ions are applied 
to invisible beings. 
Van Elk and Aleman suggest that PC HADD has a very 
broad explanatory scope. The original HADD theory and oth-
er CSR-theories have been criticized for having a too restrict-
ed scope.13 Jong et al. (2015) also complained that HADD is 
massively underdetermined by empirical data. Both problems 
were used to argue that CSR-theories do not have any epistem-
ic implications. In the next section, I will look at the epistemic 
implication of PC HADD. I will assume that Andersen, Van 
Elk and Aleman are right and that PC HADD does not suffer 
from similar problems from which older theories suffer. 
Epistemic implications of 
predictive coding
From early on, CSR attra ed the attention of phi-
losophers. Most of the discussion focused on the question 
whether CSR-theories implied a negative verdict on the 
epistemic status of religious belief.14 The original HADD 
theory has been used to argue for and against a positive epis-
temic status of religious belief. Some of the arguments can 
be re ated with the PC HADD theory. We noted above 
that the PC-HADD theory differs significantly from other 
theories of religious cognition. This section will also high-
light how the new theory leads to conclusions that are dif-
ferent from those of other theories.
The arguments I discuss below argue for or against a 
positive epistemic status of religious belief. I use the term ‘reli-
gious belief ’ to refer to belief in the existence of God or other 
supernatural being. Though the term covers more beliefs, it is 
used in this more restricted meaning in most of the existing 
arguments to which I refer. 
Unreliability argument
A common line of argument in the debate over the im-
plications of CSR-theories is that religious beliefs are unreli-
ably formed and therefore unjustified.15 A generic unreliabili-
ty argument using CSR-theories goes as follows:
(1)  CSR-theories show that the mechanisms responsi-
ble for religious belief are unreliable.
(2)  Beliefs produced by unreliable mechanisms are un-
justified.
(3) Therefore, religious beliefs are unjustified.
I will not contest premise 2, but some clarifications are 
in order. My use of the term ‘unreliable’ is in line with how 
the term is used in contemporary discussions over reliabi-
lism.16 Defenders of reliabilism argue that a belief should be 
produced by a belief-forming process that is not error-prone 
to be regarded as justified or to constitute knowledge.17 Clear 
examples of error-prone processes are wishful thinking or 
clairvoyance. While these processes can occasionally produce 
true beliefs, they usually produce false beliefs. Therefore, the 
beliefs these processes produce are not justified even when 
they are true. I will not  ecify what the ratio between true 
and false beliefs must be before a process can be regarded as 
reliable. For my purposes, it suffices that the ratio of true be-
liefs must be well over 50 %. 
I will now assess whether premise (1) holds if PC 
HADD is taken into account.18 Andersen himself suggests 
that it does. He unambiguously states that detections of 
invisible agents are ‘false positives’.19 He writes: “My funda-
mental argument is that most false positives in agency de-
tection can be seen as the result of top-down interference 
in a Bayesian system” (Andersen, 2017, p. 1). Andersen 
argues that the internal model of the world in the mind of 
religious believers makes them prone to detect (invisible) 
agents where there are none. He thereby suggests that de-
tection of agents goes astray because the internal model 
13 See for example Leech and Visala (2011).
14 The discussion is usually limited to the belief that God exists and does not include beliefs about the nature of God. For an overview 
of the discussion see McBrayer (2017) and Van Eyghen et al. (2018).
15 Arguments for unreliability were defended by Braddock (2016), Wilkins and Griffiths (2013), Goodnick (2016) and Nola (2013). Wilkins 
and Griffiths, Goodnick and Nola do not conclude that religious beliefs are unjustified but respectively undermined, unwarranted and 
debunked. I lack the space to discuss the differences between these epistemic deficiencies and limit the discussion to justification. The 
argument I discuss in this paragraph can be reformulated so as to apply to other epistemic deficiencies.
16 Reliabilist epistemologies state that a belief can be justified or amount to knowledge if it is produced by a reliable belief-forming 
mechanism (see: Goldman and Beddor, 2015).
17 In this section, I focus on justification and not on knowledge. If the argument is sound, it will imply that religious beliefs (likely) cannot 
amount to knowledge since justification is usually seen as a necessary condition for knowledge.
18 It should be noted that Andersen does not claim that religious belief in its totality, let alone all religious beliefs, are formed by the 
operations of the mechanism discussed in his theory. He does claim that the PC HADD mechanism is an important contributor to reli-
gious belief. If the arguments are true, Andersen’s theory will have a major impact on the epistemic status of religious belief. How great 
the impact is depends on how large of a contributor PC HADD will turn out tob e. For reasons of brevity, I phrased the argument as if 
religious belief in its totality is formed by PC HADD.
19 Van Elk and Aleman (2017) do not use this terminology in their discussion of PC.
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is flawed.20 Andersen also argues that the flaws are hard 
to overcome because of the elusive nature of many reli-
gious concepts. He argues that his theory, and especially 
his claim that a proneness to overdetect agency is hard to 
overcome, can explain the wide occurrence of religious be-
liefs in the human population. His claim implies that the 
flaw can be overcome with the result that the human brain 
no longer detects agents where there are none. In other 
words, the human brain can unlearn to overdetect agents 
and learn to only detect actual agents. Andersen suggests 
that this educated brain has a more accurate internal mod-
el of the world. 
Andersen’s line of reasoning appears to support prem-
ise (1). On his theory, the mechanism (partly) responsible for 
religious beliefs is the detection of invisible agents guided by 
the expectations of the internal model of the world. He claims 
that humans often have a mistaken internal model of the 
world, which makes it prone to detect invisible agents where 
there are in fact none. The mistaken detections result in re-
ligious beliefs. However, arguing for premise (1) in this way 
is dependent on an ontological commitment to naturalism. 
Andersen does not argue that an internal model without in-
visible agents or gods is more accurate but merely assumes it. 
He thereby assumes that the actual world contains no invisi-
ble agents or gods and thus that naturalism21 is true. If natu-
ralism is true, any mechanism that produces religious beliefs 
is unreliable. This shows that an argument for unreliability 
based on PC HADD ultimately depends on the truth of nat-
uralism. I lack the space to discuss the philosophical debate 
over naturalism, but a quick glance at the literature shows 
that the debate is far from settled.22 This shows that a mere 
assumption of naturalism will not do to e ablish premise (1). 
Without a well-supported premise (1) the conclusion that re-
ligious belief is unjustified does not follow.
Unsafety argument
Another argument claims that CSR-theories show 
that religious belief could easily be believed falsely.23 I will 
call this the ‘unsafety argument’. The theories allegedly show 
that mechanisms responsible for religious belief would still 
produce  religious belief if nothing supernatural exists. For 
example, on the original HADD theory, people are prone to 
form beliefs in invisible agents even when no such agents are 
around. Therefore, if HADD were to produce true beliefs, its 
success is in a relevant way due to luck.
The idea that a belief should not easily be believed falsely 
is the main idea behind the safety condition for knowledge.24 
A belief is safe if there is no very close nearby world and not 
many nearby worlds in which the belief is false and the sub-
ject would still continue to form the belief in the same way. 
On the original HADD theory, it seems that the hypera ive 
agency detection device produces unsafe beliefs. The HADD 
would produce beliefs in invisible agents in many nearby 
worlds where there are no invisible agents because vague nois-
es of patterns that vaguely remind of agency suffice to form 
these beliefs. An unsafety argument goes as follows:
(1)  CSR-theories show that subjects will form religious 
beliefs in nearby worlds where nothing supernatural 
exists.
(2)   Religious beliefs formed in a world where nothing 
supernatural exists are not true.
(3)  Therefore, CSR-theories show that subjects will 
easily form religious beliefs that are not true.
(4)  If subjects easily form religious beliefs that are not 
true, religious beliefs cannot amount to knowledge.
(5)  Therefore, CSR-theories show that religious beliefs 
cannot amount to knowledge.
In what follows, I will not contest premise (4) (i.e. 
the safety condition for knowledge applied to religious be-
lief ).25 Instead, I focus on premise (1). Before proceeding, 
it should be noted that discussing possible worlds where 
nothing supernatural exists runs into a problem. In classical 
forms of theism, God is regarded as a perfect being. Among 
other things, being perfect entails existing necessarily.26 A 
being that exists necessarily exists in all possible worlds. 
Therefore, on this version of theism there is at least one 
supernatural being that exists in all possible worlds. Being 
necessary can, however, be cashed out in a different way. 
Richard Swinburne argues that God’s existence should not 
be regarded as logically necessary. He argues that God’s be-
ing is necessary in a weaker sense, namely that “if He exists 
at any time He exists at all times” (Swinburne, 1993, p. 274). 
On Swinburne’s account, there are possible worlds where 
God does not exist and reasoning about possible worlds 
20 The flaw could result from evolutionary pressures as was argued in the original HADD theory. Andersen, however, suggests that the 
flaws are put in place by religious instruction and socialization.
21 I take ‘naturalism’ to be the metaphysical theory that nothing supernatural exists.
22 Notable recent criticisms of naturalism were raised by Rea (2002) and Plantinga (2002)
23 A similar argument using other theories of religious cognition is discussed and criticized by Clark and Rabinowitz (2011).
24 Varieties of the safety condition for knowledge were defended by Sosa (1999), Pritchard (2009) and Greco (1999). Williamson (2002) 
also discusses safety but does not regard it as a necessary condition for knowledge. Though all three accounts of safety differ in some 
regards (see: Rabinowitz, 2014), they share a commitment to the idea that a belief must not be easily believed falsely. In this section, I 
rely on Pritchard’s account of safety.
25 I note that the safety condition for knowledge has been criticized (e.g. Comesaña, 2005).
26 For a deeper discussion see Plantinga (1974).
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without any supernatural beings therein is possible. In this 
section I assume Swinburne’s account.
If Andersen’s PC HADD theory is true, it seems as if sub-
jects will form religious beliefs in worlds without anything su-
pernatural. It is plausible that in such worlds humans will have 
an internal model of the world with supernatural beings because 
of religious instruction or because having such a model is evo-
lutionary beneficial. It is also plausible that the internal model 
will not be corrected easily because of the elusive nature of re-
ligious concepts.27 However, it is not clear why there is religious 
instruction or socialization in worlds where nothing supernatu-
ral exists. Religious believers usually trace the origins of religious 
instruction back to a revelatory event or divine inspiration. 
In a naturalistic world, there can be no revelatory event or divine 
inspiration. To argue that there will be religious instruction and 
socialization without any such event, an account of where the 
instruction comes from is needed. Some authors have proposed 
accounts. Inspired by ideas of Sigmund Freud, some argued that 
religious systems were designed by rulers to keep their subjects 
in check. Accounts like these are not popular anymore. Alterna-
tive accounts are around. For example, Durkheim (1971) argues 
that religious instruction emerges from totemist pra ices. In to-
temist pra ices, groups  gathered around a representation of an 
animal. The animal represented something the group stood for. 
Hunter-groups would be inclined to gather around an image of 
a wolf while fisher-groups would prefer a bear. Durkheim argues 
that groups in fact pay homage to themselves or to something 
they find important. These gatherings gave rise to rituals, which 
in turn gave rise to stories and beliefs. 
I cannot properly assess Durkheim’s theory here.28 I do 
note that the other theories of religious cognition, like the 
original HADD-theory, did provide a fuller naturalistic ac-
count of the genesis of religious belief. It is clear that an un-
safety argument needs a plausible naturalistic account of how 
religious instruction and socialization emerged. Moreover, 
this account cannot rely on falsely detected invisible agents, 
for such an account would be circular. Andersen does not 
provide such an account. Therefore, premise (1) is not obvi-
ously e ablished by PC HADD.
PC HADD could support premise (1) with an evolu-
tionary account of how religious beliefs show up in the inter-
nal model of the world. On this version of the theory, subjects 
in nearby worlds without supernatural beings with a similar 
evolutionary history and a similar cognitive make-up would 
(erroneously) form religious beliefs. However, without an 
evolutionary account (which Andersen did not provide) this 
remains  eculative.
Naturalness argument
While most arguments based on CSR-theories conclude 
to a negative epistemic status of religious belief, some argue for 
the opposite conclusion. The arguments (I call them ‘natural-
ness arguments’) claim that CSR-theories  eak in favor of 
religious belief because they show that religious belief comes 
naturally.29 The term ‘natural’ should be read as synonymous 
with intuitive or spontaneous. The argument goes as follows:
(1)  CSR-theories show that religious belief is natural.
(2)  Beliefs that are natural are justified in the absence of 
defeaters.
(3)  Therefore, religious belief is justified in the absence 
of defeaters. 
The idea that religious belief is natural is widely affirmed 
by CSR-theorists, though not undisputed.30 Theorists claim 
that various cognitive mechanisms and biases give rise to reli-
gious beliefs without any need for religious instruction or learn-
ing. They do not argue that religious belief is innate, but rather 
that it emerges spontaneously much like beliefs about good and 
evil emerge.31 Clark and Barrett (2010) argue that beliefs that 
come naturally can be regarded as ‘innocent until proven guilty’. 
They note that humans often rely on beliefs that come natu-
rally, like beliefs about good and bad, and are justified in doing 
so. Natural beliefs can be revised or defeated, but this requires 
additional evidence. They argue that there is no reason to deny 
the same status to religious beliefs. Their line of reasoning is not 
without criticisms as well,32 which I will not go into. For now, I 
will grant premise (2) and focus on premise (1).
It is not clear that premise (1) is true if PC HADD is 
plugged in. Andersen states that invisible agents and gods are 
mainly introduced in people’s internal model of the world by 
means of religious instruction. If this is the case, religious be-
lief are not natural. Reinforcement of religious beliefs by cor-
roborating experiences still occurs without instruction, but 
this process depends on prior religious beliefs. 
I argued earlier in the paper that invisible agents or gods 
could appear in people’s internal model of the world because 
it was evolutionary advantageous. It is not implausible that 
humans are not a blank slate and that their default internal 
27 I assume that the belief-forming mechanism remains fixed in the nearby worlds. As Rabinowitz argues, this is in line with how safety 
is usually assessed. He argues that the belief-forming method should remain fixed when assessing the safety of a belief it  produces 
(Rabinowitz, 2014).
28 I do note that Durkheim’s theory has been criticized for relying on outdated anthropological evidence.
29 ‘Naturalness arguments’ were defended by Clark and Barrett (2011, 2010) and Braddock (2018).
30 For criticisms see Shook (2017) and Banerjee and Bloom (2013).
31 Barrett (2002) argues that children are ‘born believers’ like some people are ‘born singers’ or ‘born artists’. They were not born as 
singers or artists, but were born with the necessary (cognitive) equipment to become good singers or artists.
32 Adherents of evidentialism tend to deny that natural beliefs merit a positive epistemic status. See for example Feldman and Conee (2004).
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model of the world includes gods or invisible agents.33 If this is 
the case, religious beliefs are still natural.
Again, much depends on how invisible agents and gods 
ended up in the internal model of people. If they were includ-
ed after religious instruction or socialization, religious beliefs 
cannot be regarded as natural. If they result from evolutionary 
pressures, they can. Future research might settle this question. 
For now, it is not clear whether religious beliefs are natural on 
PC HADD. As a result, premise (1) is not e ablished if PC 
HADD is plugged in. Therefore, the argument is not sound.
Conclusion 
The goal of this paper was to assess what epistemic im-
plications new approaches to religious cognition that draw on 
predictive coding have. After discussing three arguments, the 
conclusion is that the theory, in its current form, is neutral. Ar-
guments against a positive epistemic status require a strong case 
for naturalism or a naturalistic account for the origins of religious 
instruction. Both are not obvious. The new theory also does not 
obviously show that religious belief is natural and hence justified.
For all arguments, progress can be made by future re-
search on predictive coding. Future research can shed light on 
how invisible agents and gods end up in the internal model of 
the world. It can also shed more light on the role of religious 
instruction and evolutionary pressures. Since the theory is 
still very young, new developments could very well bolster 
the case for any of the three arguments. Though the conclu-
sions I drew after discussing each of the three arguments are 
not far-reaching, they show that philosophers of religion, 
theologians and anyone intere ed in the epistemic status of 
religious belief should keep up with new developments.
My discussion also shows that arguments based on older 
CSR-theories cannot always easily incorporate new theories. 
This is most obvious in naturalness arguments. While older 
CSR-theories appeared to support it, the new theory does not 
in an obvious way. 
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